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TAXATION - INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAXES - POWERS OF
.A.PPOINTMENT - From time immemorial, problems arising from the
creation and exercise of powers of appointment have proven enigmatic
to the judiciary. These problems are not decadent but still possess an
abundance of vitality. The increased complexity of statutes imposing
death taxes has tended to foment litigation. These two fertile sources of
intricate problems, in combination, have borne the apprehended fruits.
The taxation of powers of appointment has created problems of infinite
variety, harassing alike the attorney, the judge and the legislator. The
questions involved are not simply of academic or theoretical importance. Under our modern death tax statutes the questions are of primary practical significance, due -to the fact that, while the power of
-appointment is a useful and ingenious dispositive device, it may also be
employed as an effective camouflage for a tax avoidance scheme.
I.

The questions involved in the taxation of powers of appointment
usually arise in a situation where F, the father, by his will, leaves a life
estate in certain property to his son, S, and, in addition, a power to ap-

1940}

COMMENTS

point the remainder of the property upon his death. The power of
appointment given to S may be a power to appoint only among particular persons or classes, in such proportions as S shall desire. On the
other hand, S may be given a power to appoint to whomever he desires.
In addition, F may choose to specify persons who will take in default
of the exercise of the power.
Statutes imposing death taxes are of two types: ( r) an inheritance
tax statute, which is theoretically a tax imposed upon the privilege of
receiving property upon the death of the benefactor; ( 2) an estate tax
statute, which is theoretically a tax upon the privilege of transmitting
property upon death. Consequently, upon the death of the donor of
the power, under an inheritance tax statute, it seems clear that the transfer of a life estate to the donee would be presently taxable. And under
an estate tax statute, it seems equally clear that the whole fee would
be included in the gross estate of the donor. The imposition of death
taxes upon the death of the donee entails a more difficult problem.
In the absence of express language in the statute taxing powers of
appointment, the common-law theory of powers prevails and the appointee is deemed to derive his interest in the property from the donor,
rather than from the donee, of the power.1 Following this theory, the
exercise of the power by the donee, under an inheritance tax statute,
would simply serve to vest the remainder, which would then be taxable
as a transfer from the donor of the power. Under an estate tax statute,
the value of the interest passing upon the exercise of the power would
not be included in the gross estate of the donee. 2
However, at an early date the state legislatures began to enact
statutes containing provisions expressly taxing powers of appointment.
Following the New York statute of 1897,3 many states imposed transfer taxes upon appointments in the same manner as though the property
1 "An estate created by the execution of a power takes effect in the same manner
as if it had been created by the deed which raised the power. The party who takes
under the execution of the power, takes under the authority, and under the grantor
of the power, whether it applies to real or personal property, in like manner as if the
power, and the instrument executing the power, had been incorporated in one instrument." 4 KENT, CoMMENTARIES, 14th ed., 337 (1896); RoBINSoN, SAVING TAXES IN
DRAFrING WILLS AND TRUSTS, 2d ed., 40 (1933); PINKERTON and MILLSAPS, INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAXES 131 (1926). See also Simes, "The Devolution of Title
to Appointed Property," 22 ILL. L. REV. 480 (1928).
2
United States v. Field, 255 U. S. 257, 41 S. Ct. 256 (1921).
8 "Whenever any person or corporation shall exercise a power of appointment derived from any disposition of property made either before or after the passage of this
act, such appointment when made shall be deemed a transfer taxable under the provisions of this act in the same manner as though the property to which such appointment relates belonged absolutely to the donee of such power and had been bequeathed
or devised by such donee by will ...•" N. Y. Laws (1897), c. 284, § 220(5).
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belonged absolutely to the donee of the power. These statutes do not
distinguish between special and general powers. Under these provisions,
the value of the remainder would be taxed as though it were a transfer from the donee. But Congress, under section 302 ( f) of the Revenue
Act of 1926 (substantially reenacted by the later acts)/ required only
that property "passing" by the exercise of a "general" power of appointment be included in the gross estate of the donee. 5 The construction of this provision in the federal estate tax law has led to tax avoidance through the use of special powers of appointment, both genuine
and simulated. 6 New York, in 1930, changed its death tax system from
one of an inheritance tax to that of an estate tax. The power provision
in the New York estate tax law was copied from that of section 302 (f) .1
But to preclude tax avoidance through the use of special powers, New
York in 1932 amended its estate tax law. 8 Recently, this provision,
4
"To the extent of any property passing under a general power of appointment
exercised by the decedent (1) by will, or (2) by deed executed in contemplation of,
or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after, his death, except in
case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth..•." Revenue Act of 1926, § 302(f), 44 Stat. L. 71. This provision has been substantially reenacted by the later acts and the Internal Revenue Code. 53 Stat. L. 122
(1939), 26 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 811(f).
5
Attention is here called to one exceptional situation where property passing by
special power is taxed. Where the donor of a special power of appointment is also the
donee, the transfer upon the death of the donee may be taxed in his estate as a transfer
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death under § 302(c), or as
a transfer with the reservation of a power to alter, amend or revoke under § 302(d)
of the Revenue Act of 1926. In Internal Revenue Commissioner v. Chase Nat. Bank,
(C. C. A. 2d, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 157, cert. denied, Chase Nat. Bank v. Commr., 299
U.S. 552, 57 S. Ct. 15 (1936), the court held that such a transfer came within the
purview of § 302(d).
6
The Treasury Department has defined a general power: "Ordinarily a general
power is one to appoint to any person or persons in the discretion of the donee of the
power, or, however limited as to the persons or objects in whose favor the appointment
may be made, is exercisable in favor of the donee, his estate, or his creditors." TREAS.
REG. 80, 1937 ed., art. 24, p. 62. This interpretation of "general power" opens a
wide avenue for tax evasion, although there are limits, even under this construction.
See Whitlock-Rose v. McCaughn, (C. C. A. 3d, 1927) 21 F. (2d) 164. For a recent
construction of the terminology, see Morgan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
309 U.S. 78, 60 S. Ct. 424 (1940), where the Supreme Court held that federal law,
and not state law, is to govern the determination of what constitutes a general power.
1 N. Y. Laws (1930), c. 710, art. 10-C, § 249-r, par. 7.
8 N. Y. Laws (1932), c. 320, § 249-r, par. 7(a), where it is provided: "To the
extent of any property passing under a power of appointment exercised by the decedent
(a) by will, or (b) by deed executed in contemplation of, or intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after, his death, except in case of a bona fide sale for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, exclusive of property the
value of which is required to be included in the gross estate pursuant to paragraph
numbered seven of this section, and provided that the transfer of such property is not

COMMENTS

which requires under certain circumstances the inclusion in the gross
estate of property passing under a special power, was upheld by the
New York Court of Appeals and by the United States Supreme Court.9
This result is in line with the apparent tendency of the Supreme Court
to disregard technical property concepts in taxation problems.1°
The evolution of statutes taxing powers of appointment has also
raised questions as to whether a tax may be imposed in the estate of the
donee when the appointee, who is also the taker in default, takes the
same interest that he would have taken had the power not been exercised. The New York courts have consistently maintained the position
that, in such instance, the interest is, in reality, derived from the donor
of the power and is not taxable in the estate of the donee. This result
is predicated upon the right of the appointee to elect to take under the
will of the donor or by intestacy, but it has been extended, under a
theory of presumed election, to any case where the interest of the
recipient as appointee is the same as that as taker in default. 11 This
extension seems justifiable, since otherwise the result would be made
to depend upon mere form and would penalize a failure to renounce.
The same conclusion has been reached under section 302(£) of the
federal estate tax upon the theory that such property is not property
"passing'' by the exercise of a general power of appointment.12 The
result seems the same whether the tax is imposed under an estate or an
inheritance tax law. In a recent New York case, the court held that the
property was not taxable in the estate of the donee although the apor was not subject to a death tax in the estate of the grantor of such power but would
have been so taxable except for a statute providing that the tax on the transfer of such
property should be imposed in the estate of the grantee of such power in the event of
the exercise thereof."
9
In re Vanderbilt's Estate, 281 N. Y. 297, 22 N. E. (2d) 379 (1939), affd.
Whitney v. State Tax Comm. of N. Y., 309 U.S. 530, 60 S. Ct. 635 (1940). In the
latter case, counsel contended that, although special powers might be taxed under an
inheritance tax law, to tax such powers under an estate tax law would be to include in
the gross estate property which was not owned by the donee of the power.
10 In Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 at II8, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1939), Justice
Frankfurter said: "The importation of these distinctions and controversies from the
law of property into the administration of the estate tax precludes a fair and workable
tax system. . • . Distinctions which originated under a feudal economy when land
dominated social relations are peculiarly irrelevant in the application of tax measures
now so largely directed toward intangible wealth."
11 In re Lansing's Estate, 182 N. Y. 238, 74 N. E. 882 (1905). In this case,
there was no renunciation. The appointees merely contested the tax. To the same effect
is In re Slosson's Estate, 216 N. Y. 79, l IO N. E. 166 ( 1915).
12
Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354 (1935), noted in 45
YALE L. J. l 72 ( l 93 5). See also the discussion of the case in Griswold, "Power of
Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 HARV. L. REv. 929 at 933 (1939).
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pointee, as taker in default, would have been required to share with
another taker in default, who was not an appointee.18
The New York statute· of 1897 contained a provision taxing the
non-exercise, as well as the exercise, of a power of appointment. u The
court then held this provision to be unconstitutional,15 and the legislature repealed the provision in 19u. However, this declaration of
unconstitutionality was unnecessary to the case before the court, and
one may well spe.culate as to the precise implications of the decision.10
Despite; this decision, other states, which had copied the New York
provision either before or after it was held unconstitutional, have held
that a state may constitutionally tax the non-exercise of a power.1 '1
This result has been approved by the United States Supreme Court.18
18 In re Duryea's Estate, 277 N. Y. 310 at 318, 14 N. E. (2d) 369 (1938),
where Hubbs, J., stated: "It is well established that where an appointee takes
the same share that would have passed to that person under the will of the donor
of the power, even in the absence of an expressed intent in the will of the donor, the
share is to be taxed as passing under the will of the donor and in such case no tax can
be imposed in the estate of the donee of the power, and if there was no tax applicable
to the estate of the donor there would be no tax upon the property transferred to the
appointee." To the same effect is James C. Webster, Exr., 38 B. T. A. 273 (1938).
See also Estate of Mary Adele Morris, 38 B. T. A. 408 (1938). The last two cases are
noted in 52 HARV. L. REv. 531 (1939).
14 "• • • and whenever any person or corporation possessing such a power of
appointment so derived shall omit or fail to exercise the same within the time provided
therefor, in whole or in part, a transfer taxable under the provisions of this act shall
be deemed to take place to the extent of such omissions or failure, in the same manner
as though the persons or corporations thereby becoming entitled to the possession
or enjoyment of the property to which such power related had succeeded thereto by
a will of the donee of the power failing to exercise such power, taking effect at the
time of such omission or failure." N. Y. Laws (1897), c. 284, § 220(5). For a compilation of other state statutes taxing the non-exercise of powers, see PINKER.TON and
MILLSAPS, INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAXES 136 (1926).
111 In re Lansing's Estate, 182 N. Y. 238 at 247, 74 N. E. 882 (1905), where
Vann, J., said: "We pass without serious discussion that part of the statute which
provides, in substance, that the failure or omission to exercise a power of appointment subjects the property to a transfer tax in the same manner as if the donee of the
power had owned the property and had devised it by will. • • • Where there is no
transfer there is no tax and a transfer made before the passage of the act relating to
taxable transfers is not affected by it, because ••• such an act imposes no direct tax and
is unconstitutional since it diminishes the value of vested estates, impairs the obligation
of contracts and takes private property for public use without compensation."
16 In this case, the donee had exercised the power. In addition, the statements
of the court seem to indicate that the decision was only intended to apply to the nonexercise of powers created prior to the enactment of the statute imposing a death tax.
1 '1 Minotv. Treasurer & Receiver General, 207 Mass. 588, 93 N. E. 973 (19n);
Montague v. State, 163 Wis. 58, 157 N. W. 508 (1916); State v. Brooks, 181 Minn.
262, 232 N. W. 331 (1930); Manning v. Board of Tax Commrs., 46 R. I. 400, 127
A. 865 (1925).
is Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 48 S. Ct. 225 (1928).
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However, section 302(f) of the Revenue Act of 1926 taxes only general powers which are exercised. It seems reasonable to assume that by
failing to exercise a power, as well as by exercising a power, the donee
does affect the course of succession, whether the power be general or
special in nature. By the non-exercise of the power, the donee, in reality,
exercises the power in favor of the takers in default. On this hypothesis,
it would seem that the taxation of the non-exercise of a power might be
justified under either an inheritance or an estate tax system.
It must constantly be kept in mind that, while upon the death of
the donor a transfer of a life estate to the donee ensues, there is also a
transfer of a remainder interest. The inheritance tax statutes generally
contain provisions for the taxation of remainder interests, whether
vested or contingent. Under most of these statutes, a contingent remainder is taxed at the death of the donor at either the highest or
lowest rate possible, and generally there is a provision for adjustment
upon the actual vesting of the interest.19 The question then arises as to
whether this transfer may also be taxed under the power provision of
the statute. In Minnesota, it has been held that a tax may be imposed
under both provisions of the statute. 20 But in Wisconsin, the court concluded that the power section is to control, and only the transfer from
the donee may be taxed. 21 Taxing under both provisions of the statute
does seem to result in unnecessary double taxation. This is particularly
true in those states which tax the non-exercise of the power. Some states
impose a transfer tax upon contingent remainders only upon the vesting
of the interest.22 Here it would seem that the taxation should be limited
to that under the powers provision by construing the statute in the
alternative. This problem would not seem to arise under an estate tax,
since the theory is that it is a tax upon the transmission, rather than
upon the reception, of property at death.
2.

When the donee is endowed with a general power of appointment,
there is a clear basis for the imposition of a death tax in his estate.
Whether we conclude that property passing under a power of appointment, either special or general, emanates from the donor or from the
donee would seem to depend upon the result which is to be desired.
19 I Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927), § 2294; Wis. Stat. (1937), §§ 72.15 (6) and
(8); ROBINSON, SAVING TAXES IN DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUSTS, 2d ed., 7-39 (1933).
20 In re Robinson's Estate, 192 Minn. 39, 255 N. W. 486 (1934).
21 Will of Morgan, 227 Wis. 288,277 N. W. 650, 278 N. W. 859 (1938), noted
in 37 MicH. L. REV. 154 (1938). Although double taxation actually resulted in this
case, it was due to the error of the representatives of the two estates.
22 For a compilation of statutes, see PINKERTON and MILLSAPS, INHERITANCE AND
ESTATE TAXES 90 (1926).
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Either conclusion could be substantiated by legal theory. Consequently,
the taxation of powers of appointment resolves itself into a question of
fundamental policy. There is a distinct conflict of interest and policy
involved. First, there is the policy involved in effectuating the purpose
of the death tax statutes to produce revenue. 23 Next, there is the policy
involved in the perpetuation of the power of appointment as a distributive device. 24 The tendency of tb,e present Supreme Court is to disregard
technical property concepts in order to further the policy of the taxing
statutes. This tendency would seem to indicate that future legislative
panaceas for the preclusion of death tax avoidance through the employment of powers of appointment will receive judicial sanction. 25
Whether the increased revenues resulting from taxation of special
powers is a more important consideration than the tax-free use of a
handy dispositive device is a question Congress will have to answer
to its own satisfaction.

William L. Howland
28 Griswold, "Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 HARV.
L. REv. 929 (1939). Professor Griswold believes that the federal estate tax law should
include the taxation of special powers of appointment. He seems to feel that, under
the present statute, the special power, in general, is an instrumentality of tax evasion.
24 Leach, "Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax-A Dissent," 52
HARV. L. REv. 961 (1939). Professor Leach believes that the inclusion of special
powers within § 302(f) would emasculate an ingenious and useful dispositive device.
He advocates the broadened interpretation of "general power," under the statute as it
now stands, to encompass the pseudo-special powers, employed solely as a tax avoidance
scheme.
25 The jurisdiction to tax powers of appointment is beyond the scope of this
comment. For a recent discussion of such problem, see comment in 53 HARV. L. REv.
1013 (1940).

